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LEGISLATION-IMPLIED CONSENT LEGISLATION IN DRUNK 
DRIVING CASES: THE CASE FOR REPEAL-People v. Mosel/e, People 
v. Danie/, People v. Wolter, 57 N.Y.2d 97, 439 N.E.2d 1235, 454 
N.Y.S.2d 292 (1982). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Implied consent is the name given to a legal fiction I often em­
ployed to obtain proof in drunk driving cases. This fiction assumes 
that each motorist consents to the testing of his blood for its alcohol 
or drug content, whether or not that person actually has consented.2 
The legal justification behind the fiction, and the resulting legisla-· 
tion, is that driving is a privilege subject to the reasonable regulation 
of the state. In return for the use of that privilege, each motorist is 
deemed to have given consent to such testing.3 Refusal to comply 
with testing results in revocation of the driver's license.4 
Implied consent legislation was first enacted by New York in 
1953.5 All states eventually followed the New York lead and en­
acted similar statutes.6 Today, despite a plethora of constitutional 
attacks7 and recodifications,8 implied consent is alive, if not well, in 
. I. A fiction of law is an assumption of a fact, which mayor may not be true, that 
the law allows for purposes of justice. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 562 (5th ed. 1979). 
2. See Comment, Drunk Drivers Versus Implied Consent: A Sobering New Illinois 
Statute, 15 J. MAR. L. REv. 479, 479 (1982). . 
3. Id 
4. Comment, The Right to Counsel Under California's Implied Consent Slatute, 9 U. 
WEST. L.A. L. REv. 73, 75 (1977). 
5. Act of April 19, 1953, ch. 854, § 1, 1953 N.Y. Laws 1876. 
6. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 9-11-4-1 (Bums Supp. 1983); IOWA CODE ANN. 
§ 321B.4 (West Supp. 1983-1984); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 343.305 (West Supp. 1983-1984). 
For a comprehensive survey of possible reasons for the universal adoption of ·implied 
consent statutes see Note, Driving While Intoxicated and the Right to Counsel· The Case 
Against Implied Consent, 58 TEX. L. REv. 935, 941-44 (1980). 
7. "Constitutional attacks on implied consent statutes focus on fourteenth amend­
ment due process and fifth amendment protections from self-incrimination. The statutes 
have also been challenged on the basis of equal protection, fourth amendment search and 
seizure, sixth amendment right to counsel, and admission of evidence of refusal." See 
Comment, supra note 2, at 483. 
8. An example of legislative efforts to deal with problems arising from implied 
consent statutes is presented in King & Tipperman, The Offense ofDriving While Intoxi­
cated· The Development ofStatutory and Case Law in New York, 3 HOFSTRA L. REv. 541 
(1975). 
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all fifty states.9 
It is the contention of this note that implied consent in drunk 
driving situations is law gone awry. The intent of the legislature, 
concerned with the menace of the drunk driver, had been to facili­
tate the means by which blood alcohol, the best evidence of intoxica­
tion, could be obtained. lO Inadvertently, what resulted were statutes 
that obstructed the use of such evidence by granting more rights to 
drunk drivers than were constitutionally required. I I The problem 
was that tests for blood alcohol involved intrusions into the body, 
and the scope of constitutional limitations on such intrusions had not 
been clearly defined. 12 This note examines how the development of 
implied consent legislation and constitutional law have remained out 
of sync, and suggests that the time has come for repeal, rather than 
recodification, of implied consent statutes. The conclusion is that 
implied consent legislation has actually obstructed the intent of the 
legislature. Such legislation has become a boondoggle and an histor­
ical snowball, doing more to keep the drunk driver on the road than 
it is doing to get him off the road. People v. Moselle, People v . .Daniel 
and People v. Wolter 13 evidence that this snowball grows larger, 
threatens to engulf another New York statute l4 and set in motion 
further unnecessary litigation and recodification of law. 15 
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
In People v. Moselle,People v . .Daniel and People v. Wolter,16 the 
New York Court of Appeals found what may be another first for 
New York. The court held that the authorization and regulation of 
the taking of blood samples was foreclosed in New York unless 
through court-order, pursuant to legislative enactment of section 
1194 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, the implied consent statute,J7 or 
9. See Note, supra note 6, at 935-36. 
10. See King & Tipperman, supra note 8, at 549-50. 
11. See infra notes 59-86 and accompanying text. 
12. Id 
13. 57 N.Y.2d 97, 439 N.E.2d 1235,454 N.Y.S.2d 292 (1982). These cases were 
decided jointly. 
14. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 240.40 (McKinney 1982). 
15. A memorandun in support of proposed amendments and recodification of sec­
tion 240.40 was circulated among New York State District Attorneys Association mem­
bers in January, 1983. New York State District Attorneys Ass'n, Memorandum in 
Support of Amending N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1194(1), (2) (McKinney Supp. 1982­
1983) and N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 240.40 (McKinney 1982) (Jan. 1983). 
16. 57 N.Y.2d 97, 439 N.E.2d 1235, 454 N.Y.S.2d 292 (1982). 
17. The relevant portion of New York's implied consent statute provides that: 
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section 240.40 of the Criminal Procedure Law,18 a discovery statute, 
or a similar court order. 19 Although resolved jointly, each case rep­
resents a varying aspect of the right of the prosecution to enter into 
evidence the results of blood tests in an attempt to demonstrate the 
alcohol content of the blood. The tests were performed on blood 
samples taken from the respective defendants following automobile 
accidents involving fatalities. In each instance, blood was taken 
from the defendant by qualified medical personnel, without the de­
fendant's express consent, without court order and pursuant to in­
structions from a law enforcement official.2° The significant 
characteristics of each case are as follows: 
In Moselle, there was no consent for the blood test, no prior 
arrest and no penal charge placed against the defendant.21 A literal 
1. Any person who operates a motor vehicle in this state shall be deemed 
to have given his consent to a chemical test of his breath, blood, urine, or saliva 
for the purpose of determining the alcoholic or drug content of his blood pro­
vided that such test is administered at the direction of a police officer. . . . 
2. If such person having been placed under arrest or after a breath test 
indicates the presence of alcohol in his system and having thereafter been re­
quested to submit to such chemical test. . . refuses to submit to such chemical 
test, the test shall not be given . . . . 
N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. § 1194(1), (2) (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983). 
18. The relevant parts of the New York discovery statute are as follows: 
2. Upon motion of the prosecutor, and subject to constitutionallimita­
tion, the court in which an indictment, superior court information, prosecutor's 
. information or information is pending ... (b) may order the defendant to pro­
vide non-testimonial evidence. Such order may, among other things, require the 
defendant to: 
(i) Appear in a line-up; 
(ii) Speak for identification by witness or potential witness; 
(iii) Be fingerprinted; 
(iv) Pose for photographs not involving reenactment of an event; 
(v) Permit the taking ofsamples ofblood, hair or other materials from 
his body in a manner not involving an unreasonable intrusion thereofor a risk of 
serious physical injury thereto; 
(vi) Provide specimens of his handwriting; 
(vii) Submit to a reasonable physical or medical inspection of his 
body. 
This subdivision shall not be construed to limit, expand, or otherwise affect the 
issuance ofa similar court order, as may be authorized by law, b?fore ihefiling of 
an accusatory instrument consistent with such rights as the defendant may derive 
from the constitution of this state or of the United States. 
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 240.40(2) (McKinney 1982) (emphasis added). 
19. Id Note that the last sentence above, a caveat sentence, recognizes that a simi­
lar court order may be authorized by law in circumstances prior to discovery. See also, 
In re Abe A., 56 N.Y.2d 288, 437 N.E.2d 265, 452 N.Y.S.2d 6 (1982). 
20. Id at 101-03,439 N.E.2d at 1236-37, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 293-94. 
21. Id at 101-02, 439 N.E.2d at 1236, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 293. Defendant Moselle 
was involved in an auto collision on March 19, 1978, in which the driver of the other 
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application of the implied consent statute22 was used to exclude evi­
dence of the alcohol content in the defendant's bloodstream in a 
prosecution under the Vehicle and Traffic Law for driving with .10 
of one per centum or more of alcohol in the blood.23 
In Wolter, blood was taken from a fully conscious defendant 
despite his refusal to consent, but after his arrest and advisement of 
his constitutional rights.24 His blood sample revealed an alcohol 
content of .23 of one percentum by weight. 25 In addition to a charge 
of driving while intoxicated [hereinafter DWI] under the Vehicle 
and Traffic Law, Wolter was indicted under the Penal Law for sec­
ond degree manslaughter and second degree assault. 26 The New 
York Court of Appeals excluded his blood test results from evidence 
in the DWI prosecution under the authority of subdivision 2 of the 
implied consent statute, and did the same in the criminal prosecution 
under the authority of section 240.40 subdivision 2 of the Criminal 
Procedure Law.27 
In IJaniel, the defendant was in a semi-conscious state, was not 
under arrest and was not asked for consent at the time the blood 
sample was taken.28 He regained full consciousness while blood was 
being drawn and, hence, neither consented nor refused to give the 
vehicle, Paul Barrett, subsequently died from the injuries sustained. Both drivers were 
transported by ambulance to the hospital. At the hospital, Sargeant Caffery of the Erie 
County Sheriffs Department, noted alcohol on Moselle's breath and directed a physician 
to take a blood sample. The test was taken although Moselle had not been arrested nor 
had his consent bee~ sought for the test. ld 
22. Subdivision 2 of section 1194 of the New York Vehicle and Traffic Law pro­
vides that the presence of either of two prerequisites, an arrest or a positive breath test for 
the presence of alcohol, will authorize the taking of a chemical blood test. Despite the 
presence of either prerequisite, however, the statute provides that if the defendant refuses 
to submit to the test that it shall not be given. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1194(2) (Mc­
Kinney Supp. 1982-1983). 
23. Moselle, 57 N.Y.2d at 107,439 N.E.2d at 1239,454 N.Y.S.2d at 297. 
24. ld at 103,439 N.E.2d at 1237,454 N.Y.S.2d at 294. Defendant Wolter was 
involved in a head-on collision on January 7, 1980, in which the operator of the other 
vehicle was killed instantly. An investigating Sheriffs deputy detected an order of alco­
hol on Wolter before he was transported to the hospital. At the hospital the deputy 
arrested the defendant, advised him ofhis constitutional rights and of the prescriptions of 
the implied consent statute, whereupon Wolter refused to consent to a blood test. After a 
phone conversation with the local District Attorney, the deputy directed a physician to 
draw a blood sample. ld 
25. ld 
26. ld 
27. ld at 109, 439 N.E.2d at 1240, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 297. 
28. ld at 103, 439 N.E.2d at 1236, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 293. On October 20, 1979, 
defendant Danier operated a van which collided with two other motor vehicles. A pas­
senger in one of those vehicles was killed. Investigating officers found a half full bottle of 
beer on the van console and two empty bottles on the dashboard. The defendant was 
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blood sample.29 Subsequent analysis found .22 of one per centum of 
alcohol in his blood.30 These results were excluded from evidence in 
a criminal prosecution for criminally negligent homicide.31 Once 
again the court used section 240.40 subdivision 2 of the Criminal 
Procedure Law as authority for the exclusion.32 
In summary, these cases presented the court with two significant 
issues. The first question was whether the results of blood tests for 
alcohol content could be used in Vehicle and Traffic Law prosecu­
tions when the statutory prerequisites, namely arrest or positive 
breath test analysis, had not been met, or having been met, could the 
results be used when the defendant had refused his consent to the 
test. These were the questions in issue in the Moselle and Wolter 
prosecutions. The second question was even if not admissible in a 
Vehicle and Traffic Law prosecution, could the results of blood tests 
be used in a subsequent criminal prosecution, when there was 
neither consent, statutory authority, nor a court order for the taking 
of the blood sample. This query was posed in both the J)aniel and 
Wolter cases. The majority answered both questions in the negative. 
Their decision was premised on statutory and non-constitutional 
principles,33 and, as a result they found it unnecessary, to consider 
any constitutional arguments.34 Their conclusion was that there was 
" [n]o room ... left for the taking of blood samples otherwise than 
pursuant to a court order issued under CPL 240.40 or a court order 
otherwise authorized by law or in conformity with § 1194."35 The 
negative inference is that the taking of blood samples to obtain evi­
dence of intoxication is foreclosed in New York other than by court 
order, and particularly as provided by these two statutes.36 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. 	 J)ue Process and the Literal Application ofImplied Consent: 
People v. Moselle 
New York law advises that "[t]he primary consideration of the 
transported to the hospital where police requested that a blood sample be taken. Id at 
102-03,439 N.E.2d at 1236,454 N.Y.S.2d at 293. 
29. Id at 103,439 N.E.2d at 1236,454 N.Y.S.2d at 293. 
30. Id 
31. Id at 103,439 N.E.2d at 1237,454 N.Y.S.2d at 294. 
32. Id at 108-09,439 N.E.2d at 1239-40,454 N.Y.S.2d at 296-97. 
33. Id at 104, 439 N.E.2d at 1237, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 294. 
34. Id 
35. Id at 110,439 N.E.2d at 1240,454 N.Y.S.2d at 297. 
36. See id 
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courts in the construction of statutes is to ascertain and give effect to 
the intention of the Legislature,"37 and that "[t]he intention of the 
Legislature is first to be sought from a literal reading of the act itself 
...."38 Moselle turns on the verbatim provision of subdivision 2 of 
section 1194.39 That section authorizes the administration of chemi­
cal blood tests only after an arrest or after a breath test indicates the 
presence of alcohol.40 Since neither of these prerequisites were met 
in Moselle, the statute gave no authority to take the blood sample. 
Use of the test results was, therefore, inadmissible evidence.41 
The court in Moselle simply applied the implied consent statute 
as the legislature wrote it and should not be faulted. The potent 
question is whether the written law reflects the intent of the legisla­
ture. That is, does it accomplish what the legislature set out to do? 
There are two relevant determinations in this regard. First, what 
was the legislative intent? Did the legislature deliberately design to 
afford drunk drivers more protection than the Constitution?42 Sec­
ond, was the blood taken in Moselle extracted in a constitutionally 
permissible fashion, even though prohibited by the implied consent 
statute? Careful analysis leads to the conclusion that the seizure of 
blood in Moselle was within constitutional bounds,43 and that the 
express language of the implied consent statute prohibiting admit­
tance of the blood test results into evidence was not the result of a 
legislative desire to render greater protection than constitutionally 
provided. It was, rather, a boondoggle, accomplishing less protec­
37. N.Y. STATUTES § 92(a) (McKinney 1971). 
38. Id § 92(b). 
39. Moselle, 57 N.Y.2d at 107, 439 N.E.2d at 1239, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 296. Judge 
Jasen, in dissent, was in accord. Id at III, 439 N.E.2d at 1241, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 298, 
(Jasen, J., dissenting). 
40. See supra note 17. 
41. See Moselle, 57 N.Y.2d at 107, 439 N.E.2d at 1239, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 296; see 
also id at III, 349 N.E.2d at 1241,454 N.Y.S.2d at 298 (Jasen, J., dissenting). 
42. Since the court found no occasion to consider constitutional arguments and 
premised its decision on statutory grounds, id at 104, 439 N.E.2d at 1237,454 N.Y.S.2d 
at 294, by implication the Moselle court must have interpreted the statute as conferring 
more protection than the constitution required. States are free to provide for more pro­
tection than the constitution requires, but not less. Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Rob­
ins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980) (citing Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967». If the 
statute had provided for less protection than required by the constitution, the court 
would have had occasion to reach constitutional arguments. If it provided for simply as 
much protection, and no more, the court's decision would not have been premised on 
statutory, but constitutional grounds. See People v. Wolter, 83 A.D.2d 187, 189, 444 
N.Y.S.2d 331, 333 (1981); People v. Paddock, 29 N.Y.2d 504, 505, 272 N.E.2d 486, 486, 
323 N.Y.S.2d 976, 977 (1971). 
43. See infra notes 59-86 and accompanying text. 
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tion for the public and more for the drunk driver than the legislature 
set out to do. What actually occurred were ill-fated attempts to 
make the statute constitutionally legitimate by reflecting the course 
of decisionallaw.44 Several historical factors and decisions of prece­
dent support this conclusion.45 
1. The Intent of the Legislature 
The New York Legislature addressed the problem of driving 
while intoxicated as early as 1910.46 In 1953, a joint legislative com­
mittee declared the intoxicated driver the most dangerous highway 
menace.47 At the same time, it was recognized that the traditional 
indicia of intoxication, odorous breath, slurred speech, bloodshot 
eyes, and lack of balance or stability, were subjective perceptions, 
difficult both to prove or to refute. The use of chemical tests for 
blood alcohol content was, therefore, enthusiastically urged.48 
Two impediments were seen, however, to a legislative mandate 
of such testing. One was a 1941 opinion of the Attorney General 
which cautioned against the use of force to compel such testing.49 
Another was the 1952 decision of the United States Supreme Court 
in Rochin v. California .50 The concern caused by Rochin was that 
should the law compel the administration of tests for blood alcohol 
content, then police efforts in enforcing that law upon an intoxicated, 
obstreperous motorist might be found by the court to be such "con­
44. See King & Tipperman, supra note 8, at 579-80. 
45. See infra notes 46-58 and accompanying text. 
46. Act of May 31,1910, ch. 374, § I, 1910 N.Y. LAWS 684; see King & Tipperman, 
supra note 8, at 544. 
47. See King & Tipperman, supra note 8, at 549 (citing NEW YORK STATE JOINT 
LEGISLATIVE COMM. ON MOTOR VEHICLE PROBLEMS, CHEMICAL TESTS FOR INTOXICA­
TION, 3 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 25, 176th N.Y. Leg. II (1953». 
48. See King & Tipperman, supra note 8, at 550; Comment, Implied Consent: Is It 
Still A Viable Concept? A National Survey of the Admission of Blood Alcohol Tests in 
Nondrunk Driving Sellings, 1977 DET. c.L. REv. 635, 676-77. 
49. See King & Tipperman, supra note 8, at 550 (citing 1941 N.Y. ATTORNEY 
GENERAL ANNUAL REpORT 143); Brief for Appellant at 5, People v. Wolter, 57 N.Y.2d 
97,439 N.E.2d 1235,454 N.Y.S.2d 292 (1982). 
50. 342 U.S. 165 (1952). Three deputy sheriffs, having some information that 
Roehin was selling narcotics, entered his dwelling and then forced open the door to his 
bedroom. Roehin was sitting partly dressed on the bed on which his wife was also lying. 
Roehin seized two capsules from a night stand and put them in his mouth. The deputies 
jumped on him and tried but failed to extract the capsules. They then brought Roehin to 
the hospital where stomach pumping produced vomiting which revealed the two capsules 
that proved to contain morphine. Roehin was convicted for possession of morphine. Id. 
at 166. The United States Supreme Court reversed the conviction, because the evidence 
was obtained by methods held to violate the Due· Process Clause of the fourteenth 
amendment. Id. at 166-74. 
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duct that shocks the conscience ... [or is] too close to the rack and 
screw ..." to be constitutionally tolerated.51 
The New York Legislature saw the resolution to these impedi­
ments in the implied consent fiction, and passed the first such statute 
in 1953.52 This fiction assumed the driver's consent to a blood test,53 
but the mechanics of the statute operated to deprive a driver of his 
operator's license upon an actual refusal to submit to the test.54 The 
need for any type of police coercion was, therefore, eliminated and 
so also, was the danger of flouting the constitutional limitation of the 
Rochin decision. 
The first implied consent statute in New York failed, however, 
not because it did not adequately avert the due process problem of 
compelling administration of blood tests, but because it neglected to 
provide fundamental procedural protections. The court in Schutt v. 
MacDuJr5 held that it was an arbitrary and unreasonable action to 
51. 	 Id at 172. 
52. 	 Act of April 19, 1953, ch. 854, § I, 1953 N.Y. Laws 1876. This statute provides: 
§ 71-a. Chemical tests. 1. Any person who operates a motor vehicle or 
motor cycle in this state shall be deemed to have given his consent to a chemical 
test of his breath, blood, urine, or saliva for the purpose of determining the 
alcoholic content of his blood provided that such test is administered at the 
direction of a police officer having reasonable grounds to suspect such person of 
driving in an intoxicated condition. If such person refuses to submit to such 
chemical test the test shall not be given but the commissioner shall revoke his 
license or permit to drive and any nonresident operating privilege. 
2. Upon the request of the person who was tested, the results of such test 
shall be made available to him. 
3. Only a duly licensed physician acting at the request of a police officer 
can withdraw blood for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content 
therein. This limitation shall not apply to the taking of a urine, saliva or breath 
specimen. 
4. The person tested shall be permitted to have a physician of his own 
choosing administer a chemical test in addition to the one administered at the 
direction of the police officer. 
Id 
53. 	 See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text. 
54. 	 See supra note 52. 
55. 205 Misc. 43, 127 N.Y.S.2d 116 (Sup. Ct. Orange County 1954). On August 10, 
1953, Louis E. Schutt, who had been a licensed operator of motor vehicles in New York 
State for thirty-eight years, was arrested for driving while intoxicated. Mr. Schutt re­
fused to submit to a blood test to determine its alcoholic content. Id at 45, 127 N.Y.S.2d 
at 120. Prior to any trial or criminal proceeding he was compelled to surrender his 
driver's license. Id at 45-46, 127 N.Y.S.2d at 120-21. The court found this an infringe­
ment upon his constitutional right to due process and commented: "[I]t is the duty of the 
court to strike:: [the implied consent statute] down if it provides for summary and substan­
tial infringement upon a prerogative of a free person at the hands of administrative of­
ficers without affording him an opportunity of a hearing." Id at 51, 127 N.Y.S.2d at 125. 
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permit revocation of a driver's license without a hearing. 56 The New 
York Legislature then amended the statute to be compatible with the 
decision in Schutt .57 
The conclusion compelled by this history is that the intent of the 
New York Legislature, in enacting and amending the first implied 
consent legislation, was to draft a statute which comported with con­
stitutional standards but did not exceed them. This was expressly 
recognized by the Schutt case which occurred within a year of the 
enactment of the implied consent statute. That decision stated: 
Having in mind the urgent need for legislation looking to­
ward the procurement of chemical tests for the purpose of defi­
nitely determining whether or not an accused driver was 
intoxicated to the extent of impairing his driving ability, this par­
ticular statute was enacted. It was the result of a great deal of 
study and the attempt was made to frame it in the particular way 
it is written for the purpose of avoiding all possible constitutional 
objections.58 
The legislative design to remain within, and to reflect, constitu­
tional bounds was clear. The real dilemma was to define just what 
those constitutional standards were. The case law that provided the 
needed insight into those standards developed after the advent of 
implied consent statutes. 
2. The Constitutional Standard 
Beithaupt v. Abram ,59 decided approximately four years after 
New York passed the first implied consent statute, was the first case 
to reach the Supreme Court that dealt with a blood alcohol test con­
ducted on the driver of a motor vehicle. Breithaupt can be viewed as 
dealing with what were seen as the two impediments to instituting 
56. Id. at 51-55, 127 N.Y.S.2d at 125-28. 
57. Act of March 19, 1954, ch. 320, § I, 1954 N.Y. Laws 1009 (amending Act of 
April 19, 1953, ch. 854, § I, 1953 N.Y. Laws 1876); see King & Tipperman, supra note 8 
at 554. 
58. SchUll, 205 Misc. at 46-47, 127 N.Y.S.2d at 121. It is both ironic and support­
ive of the contention of this note that implied consent statutes are legislative boondog­
gles, and that this law, which was enacted "for the purpose of avoiding all possible 
constitutional attack," id. , has instead invited a plethora ofconstitutional challenges. See 
supra note 7. 
59. 352 U.S. 432 (1957). Breithaupt was seriously injured when the pickup truck 
he had been operating on the highways ofNew Mexico was involved in a collision which 
killed three occupants of the other vehicle. An almost empty pint whiskey bottle was 
found in the pickup. Breithaupt was taken unconscious to the hospital where the odor of 
liquor was detected on his breath. A state patrolman requested an attending physician to 
take the blood sample which, after analysis, showed a content of .17% alcohol. Id. at 433. 
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compulsory blood alcohol analysis, namely, the warning against 
compulsion as possibly unconstitutional by New York's Attorney 
General,60 and the inference from the Rochin decision that the 
means used to extract blood might "shock the conscience."61 
The first impediment, that of compelling submission to the test, 
is dealt with in the fourth amendment unreasonable search and 
seizure and fourteenth amendment due process analysis in 
Breithaupt. There, the Court simply noted that evidence obtained in 
violation of constitutional rights was excludable in federal criminal 
prosecutions, but that the exclusionary rule did not apply to state 
proceedings.62 New Mexico's rejection of the exclusionary rule in the 
Breithaupt prosecution was, therefore, valid and the results of the 
blood tests were admissible in the state prosecution.63 
Next, in relation to Rochin, the Court distinguished Breithaupt, 
in that it found blood tests to be slight intrusions, routine in every­
day life, that were neither brutal, nor offensive nor shocked the con­
science.64 The implication was that the coerced extraction of blood 
violated federal constitutional standards but that their results could 
not be excluded in state prosecutions unless the particular state had 
adopted the exclusionary rule, or unless the conduct involved in ac­
quiring the blood sample rose to the "shock the conscience" stan­
dard ofRochin. However, "a blood test taken by a skilled technician 
is not such 'conduct that shocks the conscience.' "65 
In 1961, the Supreme Court extended the exclusionary rule to 
the states in Mapp v. Ohio .66 At this historical juncture, it would 
seem that the constitutional standard for the extraction of blood 
samples and the provisions of implied consent statutes were compati­
ble. That is, the extraction of blood to obtain evidence was not con­
stitutionally foreclosed whereas stomach pumping was, but some 
form ofconsent was necessary in order not to run afoul of the consti­
tutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures.67 
Implied consent statutes provided the required ingredient. 
60. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
61. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text. 
62. 352 U.S. at 435. 
63. Iff. 
64. Iff. at 435-39. 
65. Iff. at 452 (citing Roehin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952». 
66. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
67. The fourth amendment provides that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated ...." U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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In New York, People v. Young68 is an illustrative case of this 
judicial interpretation. The court there said ''that Breithaupt, in the 
light ofMapp ... is not controlling."69 That is, since the Mapp de­
cision, the results of a compulsory, non-volitional blood test could be 
excluded from a state prosecution. The court was then so bold as to 
predict that if the Breithaupt facts were presented to the Supreme 
Court after its decision in Mapp, the police action would be adjudg­
ed to be an illegal search and seizure in violation of the fourth 
amendment.70 The court held that, as a general proposition, any 
warrantless search was unreasonable as well as any personal search 
made before a legal arrest.71 The Young court was stating there 
could be no coercion to test vested solely by authority of statute. No 
legal compulsion to submit was viewed as constitutional unless pur­
suant to a warrant or a search incident to arrest. Consent was the 
only viable altemative.72 
The question of the necessity for consent to constitutionally ad­
minister such tests was not clearly resolved by the Supreme Court 
until 1966, thirteen years after the advent of the first implied consent 
statute. In Schmerber v. Cal((ornia,73 the need for consent was elimi­
68. 42 Misc. 2d 540, 248 N.Y.S.2d 287 (Westchester County Ct. 1964). On Septem­
ber 3, 1962, defendant Young operated a vehicle which collided with several other vehi­
cles on the New York State Thruway. Two persons died in the accident and several 
others, including the defendant, were injured. The defendant was transported to the hos­
pital, and while in an unconscious condition, a sample of his blood was withdrawn for 
analysis of its alcohol content. The sample was taken by a qualified attending physician 
at the request of a New York State trooper. It was stipulated by the parties that the blood 
tests showed .11% of alcohol by weight; that the trooper requesting the blood test did so 
upon reasonable grounds to believe that Young had been operating the vehicle under the 
influence of alcohol; and that Young had not been arrested prior to the extraction of the 
blood sample. Id. at 541, 248 N.Y.S.2d at 288. The defendant sought suppression of the 
blood test results as evidence against him on several grounds. One such ground was that 
the test was improper under New York's implied consent statute because it was done 
while he was unconscious, without his consent and prior to his arrest. Id. at 542, 248 
N.Y.S.2d at 289. The court in rendering its decision noted that the facts in this case were 
strikingly similar to those in Breithaupt. Id. at 548, 248 N.Y.S.2d at 295. 
69. Id. at 550, 248 N.Y.S.2d at 297. 
70. Id. 
71. id. at 546, 248 N.Y.S.2d at 293. 
72. In his brief, the District Attorney of Livingston County analyzed these same 
facts and argued that: "Within this judicial milieu, it was clear that the legislature in­
tended to prohibit compulsory chemical tests only when consent was necessary to comply 
with constitutional requirements. The entire thrust of the statute pointed to the 'need for 
consent' and the 'means of obtaining it.''' Brief for Appellant at 6, People v. Wolter, 57 
N.Y.2d 97, 439 N.E.2d 1235,454 N.Y.S.2d 292 (1982) (quoting State v. Berry, 121 N.H. 
324, 328, 428 A.2d 1250, 1252 (1981) (Grimes, C.l. & Bois, 1., dissenting». 
73. 384 U.S. 757 (1966). Schmerber had received a Municipal Court conviction for 
driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor. Schmerber had been arrested on this 
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nated as a constitutional prerequisite to the search and seizure of 
blood samples in drunk driving situations.74 There are two keys to 
the Schmerber decision. First, its concurrence with Breithaupt that 
blood tests were routine and commonplace in everyday life, and 
must, therefore, be considered reasonable under the fourth amend­
menU5 Second, that an exigency or emergency upheld the warrant­
less extraction of defendant's blood76 and not the simple fact that it 
was a search incident to arrest. 77 
The inescapable conclusion from this analysis is that the legal 
fiction of implied consent is not necessary to obtain blood samples in 
a constitutional fashion for the purpose of determining their alcohol 
content, at least so far as a valid arrest is concerned. Schmerber, 
however, is not definitive as to whether the blood taken from defend­
ant Moselle in the New York case was constitutionally permissible, 
charge while in the hospital undergoing treatment following an automobile accident. At 
the hospital a police officer had directed a physician to take the blood sample. The anal­
ysis of the sample indicated intoxication and the results of this analysis were admitted 
into evidence against Schmerber. Id at 758-59. 
74. See id at 766-72. 
75. Id at 771 (emphasis added). 
76. Id at 770-71; Brief for Appellant at 17, People v. Moselle, 57 N.Y.2d 97, 439 
N.E.2d 1235,454 N.Y.S.2d 292 (1982). In Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), 
the Supreme Court recognized an exigent circumstance exception to the warrant require­
ment. Id at 149-53. That case upheld the warrantless search of an automobile for con­
traband based upon probable cause. Id at 149. It found an exigency in the fact that a 
vehicle could be quickly and easily removed from the jurisdiction in which a police of­
ficer might obtain a warrant. Id at 153. The Court in Schmerber seemed to rely on the 
Carroll emergency or exigent circumstance doctrine, but did not explicitly so state. See 
generally Comment, Arrest Requirement For Administering Blood Tests, 1971 DUKE L.J. 
601, 608. The deduction to be drawn from the two cases is that the highly evanescent 
nature of alcohol in the bloodstream is sufficiently analogous to a vehicle deeing with 
contraband for the warrant exception to apply. 
77. Schmerber noted the strong suggestion in american law that the government 
has the right to search the person of the accused in a substantially contemporaneous 
manner with a lawful arrest. 384 U.S. at 769. The Court held, however, that "the mere 
fact of a lawful arrest does not end our inquiry." Id It reasoned that the search incident 
to arrest exception to the warrant requirement rested on two factors, the "immediate 
danger of concealed weapons," to the police officer and ''the possible destruction of evi­
dence under the direct control of the accused." Id (citing United States v. Rabinowitz, 
339 U.S. 56, 72-73 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting». Schmerber found that these con­
siderations had "little applicability ... to [an intrusion) beyond the body's surface." Id 
The object of the search was alcohol in the bloodstream, not weapons, and, as evidence, 
was subject to destruction only by the body's natural metabolic processes and not by any 
activity under the direct control of the accused. It would seem, therefore, that a search 
incident to arrest would never be appropriate justification for an intrusion into the body 
to secure body fluids for the production of evidence without a warrant. The Court's 
approval of the search in Schmerber, was, therefore, based on something more, and that 
something more was the exigency caused by the highly evanescent nature of alcohol in 
the bloodstream. Id at 770-71. 
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because Moselle, unlike Schmerber, was not under arrest. The ques­
tion posed in Moselle then becomes: Is implied consent legislation 
the only constitutional means by which blood samples may be ob­
tained in drunk driving situations in which no arrest has been made? 
The answer was provided by the Supreme Court decision in 
Cupp v. Murphy.78 This case stands for the proposition that a bodily 
intrusion conducted without a warrant and not incident to arrest is 
constitutionally permissible provided that: I) there was probable 
cause for arrest, 2) that the evidence sought was readily destructible, 
and 3) that the intrusion was limited to obtaining only the evidence 
in danger of being destroyed.79 Applying these three prerequisites, 
the extraction of blood in Moselle should be constitutionally upheld. 
The facts of Moselle indicate that Sergeant Caffery was able, 
upon investigation, to reconstruct the accident from the position of 
the vehicles, from the debris strewn about the road, and from mea­
surements at the accident scene. He determined that the Moselle ve­
hicle caused the accident by crossing over into the oncoming lane 
and colliding head-on with the other vehicle. Sergeant Caffery also 
observed that the weather was clear and dry, the lighting conditions 
good, and that there were no skid marks on the road. After proceed­
ing directly to the hospital, he detected a strong odor of alcohol on 
the defendant.80 Sufficient probable cause existed for a warrantless 
arrest. 
There can be no doubt that the second requirement, that of 
readily destructible evidence, was also satisfied. Schmerber specifi-· 
cally found that the percentage of alcohol in the blood diminishes 
rapidly,81 and the Court in Cupp cited Schmerber as authority for the 
necessity of the search "to preserve the highly evanescent evidence 
78. 412 u.s. 291 (1973). In this case the defendant voluntarily submitted to police 
questioning in the presence of his counsel. His wife had been found earlier at her home 
strangled, with abrasions and lacerations on her throat. Id at 292. During questioning 
the police noticed a dark spot on the defendant's finger which they suspected might be 
the decedent's blood. The police requested to take fingernail scrapings. Defendant Mur­
phy refused, id at 292, put his hands in his pockets and a metalic sound was heard which 
was thought to be the rattling of keys or change. Id at 296. The police then took the 
fingernail scrapings without a warrant, despite Murphy's protest. Id at 292. 
79. Id at 296. In recognizing that such a search, to be permissible, must be limited 
in its scope, the Court was following the principle acknowledged in Chimel v. California, 
395 U.S. 752 (1969), "that the scope of a warrantless search must be commensurate with 
the rationale that excepts the search from the warrant requirement." Cupp, 412 U.S. at 
195 (footnote omitted). 
80. Brief for Appellant at 22-23, People v. Moselle, 57 N.Y.2d 97, 439 N.E.2d 1235, 
454 N.Y.S.2d 292 (1982). 
81. 384 U.S. at 770. 
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they found under his fingernails. "82 
The final element in Cupp necessary to permit a search without 
an arrest is that the scope of the search must be of a limited intru­
sion.83 Cupp defined that limited intrusion to be "commensurate 
with the rationale that excepts the search from the warrant require­
ment."84 The rationale exempting the search is the destructibility or 
highly evanescent nature of the evidence.85 It logically follows, 
therefore, that a search must be limited to obtaining only that evi­
dence in danger of destruction or dissipation. Nothing more must be 
searched because nothing more is subject to being destroyed or dissi­
pated. In Cupp then, the search was limited to the fingernail scrap­
ings, and in Moselle, to the extraction and testing of blood for its 
alcohol content.86 
These Supreme Court decisions, occurring subsequent to the ad­
vent of implied consent laws, have rendered those laws superfluous, 
and actually obstructionist in obtaining the best evidence to prove 
intoxication. Moselle best exemplifies to what extent this legislation 
has outgrown its usefulness. Instead of providing the mechanism 
through which evidence of Moselle's intoxication could be obtained, 
the implied consent statute provided the legal technicality through 
82. Id at 296 (citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966)). 
83. Id 
84. Id at 295. 
85. Id at 296. 
86. The following deceptively attractive argument was made by counsel for the 
defense: 
[T]he extraction of blood from an individual is a far more serious intrusion than 
scraping under one's fingernails. Scraping one's fingernails can be compared to 
a pat and frisk for weapons, a limited intrusion for which an arrest need not be 
made. On the other hand, the extraction of someone's blood, even in a hospital 
by a physician or nurse, is a far more serious intrusion into the privacy of an 
individual. The extraction of blood is akin to a full search which this Court 
. . . has found requires an arrest, not just probable cause to arrest, prior to said 
full search. 
Brief for Respondent at 12, People v. Moselle, 57 N.Y.2d 97, 439 N.E.2d 1235, 454 
N.Y.S.2d 292 (1982). The argument fails for two reasons. First, it neglects the fact that 
reasonableness is the standard governing application of the fourth amendment, and that 
the finding of Schmerber was that a blood alcohol search was reasonable under the cir­
cumstances. 384 U.S. at 771. It does not become unreasonable because a lesser intru­
sion, such as fingernail scraping, was also reasonable; nor would another lesser, but 
reasonable, intrusion render the Cupp decision invalid. Secondly, the argument miscon­
strues the nature of a full search which is prohibited, and a limited intrusion which is 
permitted in an exigent circumstance situation. A full search is one that is usually justi­
fied by other than exigent circumstances. A limited intrusion is one which must be "rea­
sonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first 
place." Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 295 n.2 (1973) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I 
(1968». 
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which it was excluded. If the constitution does not require such 
laws, and they unwittingly advance the evil at the expense of the 
remedy, then legislative reform is in order. 
B. 	 Discovery In The Criminal Procedure Law And Driving While 
Intoxicated' People v. Wolter 
Unlike defendant Moselle, defendant Wolter was under arrest 
at the time the blood sample was taken.87 The literal application of 
the implied consent statute still operated, however, to exclude the 
results in a driving while intoxicated prosecution due to the provi­
sion expressly providing that if a person placed under arrest refuses 
to submit to such testing, the test shall not be given.88 Wolter, unlike 
Moselle, was also indicted under the Penal Law for second degree 
manslaughter and second degree assault.89 The New York Court of 
Appeals found, in this novel decision, that section 240.40 of the 
Criminal Procedure Law (CPL 240.40) prohibited blood tests in fur­
therance of a criminal investigation without a court order.90 
1. 	 The Literal Interpretation of the Statute 
The position of this note is that both the wording of the statute 
and the interpretation of its legislative history more appropriately 
support the views expressed by Justice Jasen in the dissent than they 
do the majority holding. Justice Jasen first noted that CPL 240.40 
was a discovery statute which operated only against a defendant 
once a criminal proceeding had commenced. Absent such com­
mencement there is no defendant, and the authority of the statute 
does not apply to one who is merely a suspect.91 This view is sup­
ported by the express language of CPL 240.40 subdivision 2 which 
authorizes "the court in which an indictment, superior court infor­
mation, prosecutor's information or information is pending" to re­
quire the defendant to submit to giving a blood sample.92 The terms 
defendant and suspect are not ambiguous nor interchangeable. The 
distinction, rather, between the accused in a criminal case and a per­
87. 	 57 N.Y.2d at 103, 439 N.E.2d at 1237, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 294. 
88. Id at 105, 439 N.E.2d at 1237, 454 N'y.S.2d at 294; see N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. 
LAW § 1194(1) (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983). 
89. 	 Woller, 57 N.Y.2d at 104,439 N.E.2d at 1237,454 N.Y.S.2d at 294. 
90. 	 Id at 109,439 N.E.2d at 1240,454 N.Y.S.2d at 297. 
91. Id at 57 N.Y.2d 97, 111,439 N.E.2d at 1241,454 N.Y.S.2d at 298 (Jasen, J., 
dissenting). 
92. 	 Id (citing N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 240.40(2) (McKinney 1982». 
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son reputed to be involved in a crime is commonly underst<?od.93 
This note has previously determined that the primary concern of the 
courts in construing statutes is to "give effect to the intent of the 
Legislature,"94 and that the intent is "first to be sought from a literal 
reading of the act itself."95 It is not now recommended that these 
principles be abandoned, and the literal meaning of the term "de­
fendant" be extended to include anyone who is a "suspect." 
Generally, in the construction of statutes, the legislative intent is 
to be sought and ascertained from the words and language used 
. . . . Ordinarily the courts are not at liberty to hold that the Leg­
islature had an intention other than its language imports, and new 
language cannot be imported into a statute. . . . The Legislature 
is presumed to mean what it says, and if there is no ambiguity in 
the act, it is generally construed according to its plain terms. . . to 
its natural and most obvious sense. . . in accordance with its or­
dinary and accepted meaning.96 
CPL 240.40 expressly refers to defendants.97 It is an unneces­
sary and improper construction to extend its meaning to include 
those who are deemed merely suspects. 
2. The Legislative History of the Statute 
In addition to the statute's literal meaning, the legislative his­
tory also reveals an interpretation incongruous with the one imposed 
by the court of appeals. The decision in Wolter and Daniel was pre­
mised on the notion that the purpose of CPL 240.40 was to restrict 
the parties' ability to gather information or non-testimonial evidence 
to those instances where a court order was issued.98 This is an incor­
rect premise, for the true impetus behind the bill had been to expand 
rather than exclude the availability of relevant data or information, 
including non-testimonial evidence. The Governor's Program Bill # 
138 Memorandum clearly sets forth the purpose: "To expand pre­
trail discovery in criminal cases."99 The Office of Court Administra­
93. For a definition of these terms see BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 377, 1297 (5th 
ed. 1979). 
94. N.Y. STATUTES § 92(a) (McKinney 1971); see supra text accompanying note 
36. 
95. N.Y. STATUTES § 92(b) (McKinney 1971); see supra text accompanying note 
38. 
96. N.Y. STATUTES § 94 (McKinney 1971) (footnotes omitted). 
97. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 240.40(2) (McKinney 1982). 
98. See 57 N.Y.2d at 109-10,439 N.E.2d at 1240,454 N.Y.S.2d at 297. 
99. Governor's Program Bill 138 Memorandum at 1 (1979) (available from New 
York State Archives in Bill Jacket 6163, 1979 ch. 412). 
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tion had recommended the legislation because it "substitute[dJ new, 
expanded discovery procedures for both defense and prosecution 
... designed to broaden criminal discovery, while accommodating 
reasonable concerns of prosecutors and defense counsel."IOO Simi­
larly, the bill was supported by District Attorneys because "some de­
gree of reciprocity in the people's rights to obtain discoverable 
material both by demand and by order has been expanded,"JOI and 
because it provided "a reasonable and balanced step forward in 
broadening pre-trial discovery."102 Most convincing is the statement 
that "[tJhe bills are evenly balanced to avoid giving any undue ad­
vantage to either side in a criminal proceeding." 103 It is incongruous 
to believe that district attorneys would rally to support a measure 
that placed prosecutorial burdens on them that had not previously 
been imposed, and that caused them to forego use of evidence, not 
obtained through court order, that was otherwise constitutionally 
permissible. The apparent legislative motive was not to cramp the 
prosecutor's nor the defense's ability to obtain evidence after the 
criminal proceeding commenced, but to facilitate the procuring of 
what was constitutionally permissible by minimizing needless, un­
regulated litigation. I04 To accept the court of appeals decision is to 
accept, in the face of the foregoing statements, that the legislature 
actually sought to establish an advantage for the defense not ac­
corded to them by the Constitution. 
As conclusive support that CPL 240.40 was enacted to preempt 
any other legal authorization or regulation of blood tests in criminal 
cases, other than by court order, the majority cited the caveat sen­
tence of subdivision 2: 
This subdivision shall not be construed to limit, expand or other­
wise affect the issuance ofa similar court order, as may be author­
ized by law, before the filing of an accusatory instrument 
consistent with such rights as the defendant may derive from the 
100. Letter from Frederick Miller to Honorable Richard A. Brown (June 26, 1979) 
(discussing S. 6163, 1979 N.Y. State Leg., 20lst Reg. Sess.) (available from New York 
State Archives in Bill Jacket 6163, 1979 ch. 412). 
101. Memorandum of Office of Richmond County District Attorney (June 25, 
1979) (available from New York State Archives in Bill Jacket 6163, 1979 ch. 412). 
102. Letter from Patrick D. Monserrate to the Governor of the State of New York 
(June 8, 1979) (discussing S. 6163, N.Y. State Leg., 20lst Reg. Sess.) (available from New 
York State Archives in Bill Jacket 6163, 1979 ch. 412). 
103. Memorandum of State of New York Executive Chamber (July 5, 1979) (avail­
able from New York State Archives in Bill Jacket 6163, 1979 ch. 412). 
104. See supra notes 99-103 and accompanying text. 
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constitution of this state or of the United States. 105 
To assert that this provision provides unbridled support for the 
majority position is certainly refutable. The primary argument 
against this contention is that the sentence was added to clarify the 
fact that CPL 240.40 "does not change other existing law governing 
such procedures especially in the pre-accusatory instrument 
stage."I06 The entire thrust both of the language and history of the 
act is that "this CPL article was not enacted to create additional drag 
on the criminal process but rather to remove some of the barnacles 
which impede smooth flOW."I07 It should not, therefore, be con­
strued to require a court order where previously other legal authori­
zation had required none. 
The most supportive aspect of this provision for the majority 
position is the use of the phrase "before the filing of an accusatory 
instrument" in conjunction with the term "defendant" in the caveat 
sentence. lOB From this use of the term "defendant" in the statutory 
language, the majority gleaned the inference that the legislature was 
contemplating to foreclose the taking of blood in any manner other 
than by court order. I09 The problem with such a conclusion is that 
another inference can also be drawn which expresses the position of 
the practice commentary that: "A caveat sentence is added to make 
clear that this prosecutor's motion does not change other existing law 
governing such procedures especially in the preaccusatory instru­
ment stage."110 The use of the term defendant is merely an in­
advertant reflection of the fact that the drafters were constructing a 
statute pertaining to an accused in a criminal proceeding. They in­
tended by use of this sentence only to clarify and give notice that the 
law relating to that defendant before he was accused was not 
changed, but remained consistent with constitutional standards. III 
Even if it would be conceded, however, that the subdivision was am­
biguous, then the court would still be obliged to construe the act in 
such a manner "as to suppress the evil and advance the remedy", 112 
in other words to prefer that construction "which furthers the object, 
105. 57 N.Y.2d at 110,439 N.E.2d at 1240,454 N.Y.S.2d at 297 (citing N.Y. CRIM. 
PROC. LAW § 240.40(2) (McKinney 1982». 
106. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 240.40 Practice Commentary (McKinney 1982). 
107. Id. 
108. See 57 N.Y.2d at 110 n.4, 439 N.E.2d at 1240 n.4, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 297 n.4. 
109. Id. at 110,439 N.E.2d at 1240, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 297. 
110. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 240.40 Practice Commentary (McKinney 1982). 
Ill. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 240.40(2) (McKinney 1982). 
112. N.Y. STATUTES § 95 (McKinney 1971). 
483 1983) IMPLIEIJ CONSENT 
spirit and purpose of the statute." I 13 The thrust behind the legisla­
tion was to reduce resort to court orders, and to make available to 
the parties what they constitutionally and legally had a right to ob­
tain. It should not be presumed that the district attorneys who sup­
ported the statute set out to restrict their ability to obtain evidence. 
3. The Constitutionality of the Extraction 
If the majority's construction of CPL 240.40 is incorrect as this 
note and the dissent both conclude, then the constitutionality of the 
extraction of the blood sample in Wolter must be addressed. I 14 The 
pertinent question then becomes: Is it consistent with constitutional 
standards to extract blood from a suspect for the purpose of ob­
taining evidence for possible future use in a criminal prosecution? 
This is precisely the issue answered affirmatively by the Supreme 
Court in Cupp v. Murphy, 115 provided that three prerequisites are 
met. 116 First, there must be probable cause for arrest (the odor of 
alcohol was detected on defendant Wolter's breath),117 second, that 
the evidence sought was readily destructible (blood alcohol is of a 
highly evanescent nature),1l8 and third, that the intrusion was lim­
ited to obtaining only the evidence in danger of being destroyed (the 
taking of a blood sample in Wolter was the only body intrusion 
performed). I 19 
In the present case, the holding of the court of appeals in its 
very recent decision, In re Abe A. ,120 was also seen to presage the 
question. There it was decided to be constitutionally permissible to 
extract a blood sample from a suspect provided that a court order 
was issued after a showing of "(1) probable cause to believe the sus­
113. Id § 96. 
114. 57 N.Y.2d at 112-13,439 N.E.2d at 1242,454 N.Y.S.2d at 299. 
115. 412 U.S. 291 (1973). 
116. See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
117. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
118. See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text. 
119. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
120. 56 N.Y.2d 288, 437 N.E.2d 265, 452 N.Y.S.2d 6 (1982). The respondent in 
this case, Jon L., was the business partner of the decedent, who, after being reported 
missing by the respondent, was found bludgeoned to death after what appeared to be a 
violent struggle. An investigator noticed abrasions, swelling, bruises and tooth marks on 
Jon L., whose explanation for them could not be validated or corroborated. An analysis 
of blood found at the scene of the crime showed the two types, one belonging to the 
deceased, and the other a rare type belonging to less than I% of the population. After 
Jon L. refused to voluntarily submit to a blood test, a court order was sought to compel 
him to take the test and have his blood type identified. Id at 291-92, 437 N.E.2d 266-67, 
452 N.Y.S.2d at 8. 
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pect has committed the crime, (2) a 'clear indication' that relevant 
material evidence will be found, and (3) the method used to secure it 
is safe and reliable."121 Assuming that these prerequisites were ful­
filled, the court of appeals, nonetheless, found the taking of blood 
samples in Wolter to be constitutionally impermissible because there 
was no court order to authorize the taking. 122 
What remains remarkable about the majority's application of 
A be A. to the circumstances in Wolter, is its seeming disregard of the 
very basis of its own decision. The decision in Abe A. was premised 
on five perceptions: first, that the requirement to obtain a warrant is 
a requirement that there be a prior judicial determination that prob­
able cause exists; second, that in Cupp and Schmerber, the failure to 
obtain a warrant, that is, the failure to obtain a prior judicial deter­
mination of probable cause, was excused by the presence of exigent 
circumstances; third, that when there is no exigent circumstance, in 
other words, no imminent danger that the evidence will be de­
stroyed, the rule is to the contrary and a warrant must be obtained; 
fourth, that although an exigency will excuse the lack of a warrant, it 
will not excuse the lack of probable cause; fifth, that when the appli­
cation and relief sought comport with a search warrant, the differ­
ence in nomenclature between that and a court order is not 
material. I23 Applying these perceptions, the court concluded that 
the standard of probable cause necessary for issuance of a search 
warrant was necessary for the issuance of a court order to compel the 
respondent in Abe A. to submit to giving a blood sample, and that 
such an order must be obtained because no exigency existed. 124 A 
person's blood type was not capable of transformation, whereas 
blood alcohol or fingernail scrapings were capable of dissipation or 
destruction. 125 The court found it constitutionally permissible, 
therefore, to extract blood from a suspect for the purpose of ob­
taining evidence for possible future use in a criminal prosecution 
121. Id. at 291, 437 N.E.2d at 266,462 N.Y.S.2d at 7. 
122. Woller, 57 N.Y.2d at 108,439 N.E.2d at 1239,454 N.Y.S.2d at 296. 
123. AbeA., 56 N.Y.2d at 294-96, 437 N.E.2d at 268-69, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 9-10. 
124. 	 A pertinent part of the decision reads as follows: 
True it is in Cupp and in Schmerber, judicial determination of probable 
cause [i.e. the warrant requirement] was not made prior to the seizure, but, as 
we have already indicated, this was held permissible in those cases only because 
of exigent circumstances. A fortiori, when there is no danger of imminent de­
struction of the evidence for the procurement of which a person is to be de­
tained, the rule is to the contrary. 
Id. at 295,437 N.E.2d at 269, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 10. 
125. See id. 
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only upon court order. 126 In the presence of exigent circumstances, 
however, probable cause, but not a court order, is necessary.127 Al­
though cited as authority for the majority position,128 it would seem 
that A be A. more appropriately supports the dissent. 129 
The focus of the entire decision inAbeA. had been on constitu­
tional analysis of search and seizure. The court found no occasion to 
even mention CPL 240.40. Inexplicably the majority then, both in 
People v. Wolter and People v. Daniel, failed to reach constitutional 
issues,130 focusing instead on CPL 240.40 and concluded that the 
taking of blood was foreclosed other than by court order.13I It did 
this blithely through the simple deduction that the judgment ren­
dered in Abe A. also required a court order, but strangely neglected 
the relevancy in that case of its own lengthy consideration of prob­
able cause and exigent circumstances. 132 The court of appeals was, 
remarkably, finding consistency where there was none to be found. 
In Abe A., which was decided on June 17, 1982, the court did not 
find CPL 240.40 but standard constitutional principal as the source 
126. Id 
121. The decision continued on to state: 
lI]t seems appropriate to add, since here there was no exigency, that the course 
followed by the People in bringing on its original application on notice to the 
suspect was. . . required by such circumstances. After all, when frustration of 
the purpose of the application is not at risk, it is an elementary tenet of due 
process that the target of the application be afforded the opportunity to be 
heard in opposition before his or her constitutional right to be left alone may be 
infringed. 
Id at 296, 437 N.E.2d at 269, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 10 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
The inference here is that an application for a court order would not be required in the 
presence of exigent circumstances. 
128. 51 N.Y.2d at 108, 439 N.E.2d at 1239,454 N.Y.S.2d at 296. 
129. Judge Jasen expressly arguing this point in dissent said: 

Although Maller ofAbe A. involved an instance in which a court order was 

obtained authorizing the test, we emphasized that, unlike the present cases, 

there were no exigent circumstances which justified the immediate, warrantless 

removal of the blood sample from the suspect's body. 

Measured by the standards set forth in Schmerber and Maller ofAbe A. , 
the blood samples taken from defendants Wolter and Daniel should not be sup­
pressed. In both cases, the police had probable cause to believe the defendants 
had committed a crime. Moreover, there were signs that both defendants had 
been drinking just prior to the accidents in which they were involved. Thus, 
there was a "clear indication" that administration of the test would reveal the 
presence of alcohol in their blood. Finally, there is nothing in the record to 
suggest that the method used to obtain the sample from either defendant was 
unsafe or unreliable. 
Id at 113-14,439 N.E.2d at 1242-43, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 299 (Jasen, J., dissenting). 
130. Id at 104, 439 N.E.2d at 1237, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 294. 
131. Id at 110,439 N.E.2d at 1240,454 N.Y.S.2d at 297. 
132. See supra notes 123-27 and accompanying text. 
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of authority to issue a court order. 133 This was in accord with the 
court's own expectations since the authority of CPL 240.40 was un­
derstood to apply to defendants in criminal proceedings and not sus­
pects. 134 Merely two weeks later, however, on July 1, 1982, in 
rendering its decision in the Wolter and Daniel cases, the court 
found the authority of CPL 240.40 conc1usive. 135 The constitutional 
issue of exigent circumstances was summarily dismissed with the 
statement: "While the existence of exigent circumstances may ex­
cuse the failure to obtain a court order, their existence does not pro­
vide a source of authority to conduct discovery."136 This reasoning, 
however, is circuitous. Furthermore, the judicial thrust of this pre­
arrest investigatory situation into discovery is incongruous. The au­
thority of CPL 240.40 (2)(b) is to grant a court order.137 That which 
admittedly excuses the necessity of having a court order, exigent cir­
cumstances, cannot logically be expected to provide a source of au­
thority for getting a court order. The extension of discovery to pre­
arrest investigatory situations is a dangerous precedent surely due to 
hamper constitutionally fair and efficient law enforcement. 
C. 	 The Unconscious Driver and the Necessity ofArrest: People v. 
Daniel 
In People v. Daniel, as in People v. Wolter, the New York Court 
of Appeals found dispositive the fact that no court order had been 
obtained to take the blood sample, and suppressed the evidence. l38 
Although the authority for the finding was section 240.40 of the 
Criminal Procedure Law, another important issue relating to the im­
plied consent statute is raised by the Daniel case that is worthy of 
discussion. The problem of the unconscious driver is another exam­
ple of the obstruction to fair law enforcement caused by implied con­
sent legislation. The basic question arising in this context is: Should 
the unconscious driver's consent to a chemical testing of his blood 
still be deemed implied or should it be deemed withdrawn? Gener­
ally implied consent statutes are either silent on the subject or ex­
pressly provide that in such a case consent is either not to be deemed 
withdrawn or not to be implied. In each case the public interest in 
protection from drunken drivers is frustrated. 
133. 	 56 N.Y.2d at 295-99, 437 N.E.2d at 268-71, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 9-12. 
134. 	 See id at 293-94, 437 N.E.2d at 268, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 9. 
135. 	 57 N.Y.2d at 108-09,439 N.E.2d at 1240,454 N.Y.S.2d at 297. 
136. 	 57 N.Y.2d at 109,439 N.E.2d at 1239-40,454 N.Y.S.2d at 296-97. 
137. 	 See supra note 18. 
138. 	 57 N.Y.2d at 108,439 N.E.2d at 1239,454 N.Y.S.2d at 296. 
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If an implied consent statute provides only for actual consent 
from an unconscious driver, problems abound. First, there is a sense 
of absurdity about the requirement. How does one obtain actual 
consent from an unconscious driver? Second, it puts the unconscious 
driver in a preferred position and hence invites equal protection at­
tacks, since the intoxicated unconscious driver, unlike his conscious 
counterpart, will not be penalized for failing to consent to a blood 
test. 139 Third, it rewards the driver for imbibing past consciousness 
in that it neither subjects him to the blood test nor to the sanctions 
for refusal to take it. l40 Fourth, it frustrates the ability of the state to 
secure the best evidence in criminal trials. 141 
The New York implied consent statute is silent on the sub­
ject. 142 Such silent statutes are usually construed in conformity with 
those expressly providing that consent is not to be deemed with­
drawn. 143 Here the logic is that the driver "has impliedly consented 
to the test by virtue of his driving privilege, and it would seem that 
such consent is still 'intact' irrespective of whether he is conscious or 
not."I44 New York recently resolved the issue in accord with this 
interpretation in People v. Kates,145 decided October 27, 1981, just 
several months before People v. Daniel came before the court. In his 
opinion, Judge Wachtler worte: 
Literally read the statute was not violated . . . because the 
defendant had not refused consent. . . . [S]ubdivision 2 cannot 
be read as requiring the driver's express consent because that 
would effectively nullify the consent implied in subdivision I or at 
least make the statute inherently inconsistent. In any event . . . 
[t]he legislative committee responsible for this statute noted in its 
report: "In the case of an unconscious individual, a chemical test 
can be administered since he is deemed to have given his consent 
when he used the highway. It is not necessary that a person be 
given the opportunity to revoke his consent."I46 
The inherent difficulty is that implied consent statutes, includ­
ing New York's, usually mandate a prerequisite of arrest before a 
139. Note, Search Prior to Arrest Held Illegal Per Se AndAction By County Coroner 
Acting Outside The Scope OfHis Authority Held To Be State Action, 25 U. KAN. L. REv. 
268, 272 (1977). 
140. Comment, supra note 48, at 676. 
141. Id 
142. See supra note 17. 
143. Comment, supra note 48, at 648. 
144. Id 
145. 53 N.Y.2d 591, 428 N.E.2d 852, 444 N.Y.S.2d 446 (1981). 
146. Id at 595-96, 428 N.E.2d at 854, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 448. 
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blood test can be administered. 147 Such a requirement in the case of 
an unconscious driver amounts to an elevation of form over sub­
stance. There are two problem areas, a misdemeanor arrest situation 
and a medical emergency. 
Laws of most states allow a police officer to arrest without a 
warrant in the case of a misdemeanor only if it is committed in his 
presence. 148 If the misdemeanor is not committed in the presence of 
the officer, he is frustrated from making the arrest. If he cannot 
make the arrest, the implied consent statute prohibits the blood sam­
ple from being taken from either a conscious or unconscious driver. 
Should the officer later secure a warrant to make the arrest, the 
blood alcohol is most likely to have disappeared or dissipated signifi­
cantly. At that point, the probable cause, which was necessary to 
sustain the warrant, may be insufficient to sustain the charge, which 
must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. This occurs because the 
implied consent statute has operated to effectively prohibit the police 
from obtaining the best evidence. 
The other problem area is the medical emergency, which is most 
frequent in an unconscious driver situation. Even assuming that it is 
possible to arrest a semi-conscious or unconscious person, the rule 
mandating a prior arrest before a blood sample is taken will require 
police to focus on formal arrest procedure when their attention and 
efforts are best directed at obtaining medical assistance. 149 In the 
present case, Lieutenant Brennan and Officer Willis came on the 
scene moments after the collision and observed defendant Daniel in 
a semi-consciouS state, in a large pool of blood, and lying on the 
ground. Empty beer bottles were found on the dashboard and floor 
of his vehicle, and the remainder of an eight pack was on the front 
seat. Lieutenant Brennan remained at the scene to complete the in­
vestigation while Officer Willis accompanied Daniel to the hospital. 
There it was requested that a blood sample be taken. ISO Officer Wil­
lis had made no formal arrest. Although a medical emergency and 
probable cause for arrest existed, and although it had been decided 
in New York that blood could be extracted from an unconscious 
driver without his express consent,l51 the New York implied consent 
147. E.g., N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1194(1) (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983). 
148. Comment, supra note 76, at 616. The present version of N.Y. CRIM. FRoc. 
LAW § 140.10(1)(b) (McKinney 1981) no longer has this requirement. 
149. Note, supra note 139, at 272. 
150. Brieffor Appellant at 9-11, People v. Daniel, 57 N.Y.2d 97, 439 N.E.2d 1235, 
454 N.Y.S.2d 292 (1982). 
151. 53 N.Y.2d at 595-96, 428 N.E.2d at 854, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 448. 
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statute provided that an actual arrest, or positive breath test, was a 
condition precedent to a chemical test of the blood. ls2 The issue was 
before the court on appeal but went undecided when the discovery 
statute, CPL 240.40 was held to foreclose the matter. IS3 Its general 
significance to implied consent legislation, however, is still notewor­
thy, because, once again, implied consent legislation, rather than 
helping to procure evidence of intoxication, acts to exclude it. 
Law enforcement should not be so frustrated unless a prerequi­
site of arrest is constitutionally mandated. Case law does not appear 
to indicate that it is. In Cupp and Abe A. probable cause, but no 
prior arrest, was necessary prior to taking the blood sample. ls4 In 
the present case, defendant Daniel did not challenge the existence of 
sufficient probable cause, but complained, rather, that blood was ex­
tracted prior to arrest which was contrary to the directive of the im­
plied consent statute. In essence, this directive was seen as 
conferring some "right to be arrested."ISS Since the court of appeals 
reached its decision on other grounds, this question was not ad­
dressed. The dissent, however, emphatically noted that there is no 
constitutional right to be arrested; that law enforcement officials 
have no constitutional duty to make an arrest as soon as a minimal 
amount of probable cause is ascertained. ls6 Police are not required 
to halt the investigation but may gather additional evidence neces­
sary to support a criminal conviction. ls7 There is a legitimate inter­
est in not being prosecuted but there is no such comparable interest 
in being prosecuted. ISS 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Implied consent is a legal fiction. Legal fictions are desirable 
only if they aid in furthering some legitimate end. Implied consent, 
however, has not proven an aid to justice but a frustration, resulting 
in an unending plethora of litigation involving numerous statutory 
and constitutional attacks lS9 with various jurisdictions applying con-. 
152. See supra note 17. 
153. 57 N.Y.2d at 109, 439 N.E.2d at 1240, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 297. 
154. See supra notes 78-79, & 120-21 and accompanying text. 
155. 57 N.Y.2d at 114, 439 N.E.2d at 1243, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 299-300 (Jasen J., 
dissenting) (citing Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 310 (1966». 
156. Id 
157. Id 
158. Abe A., 56 N.Y.2d at 297, 437 N.E.2d at 270, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 11 (citing In re 
Abe A., 81 A.D.2d 362, 371, 440 N.Y.S.2d 928, 933 (1st Dep't 1981». 
159. See supra note 7. 
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trary principles. 160 
Implied consent statutes in drunk driving situations are an ex­
ample of law gone awry, of legislative good intent transformed into 
boondoggle. Constitutional decisions have defeated any possible 
usefulness of such statutes and they should be repealed, recognizing 
that public protection from drunk drivers deserves more, and consti­
tutional protection due such drivers demands less. The decision in 
Moselle is a striking example of implied consent granting the drunk 
driver more rights than constitutionally enjoyed. Recognition of the 
fact that implied consent has outlived its usefulness has perhaps been 
stymied by two factors: (I) that the constitutional decisions render­
ing implied consent laws superfluous, if not obstructionist, came sub­
sequent to the advent of those laws, and (2) that it just seemed too 
incredulous that something which sounded so good could be so bad. 
The decision of the New York Court of Appeals in J)aniel and 
Wolter is so novel and surprising that perhaps an unusual surmise is 
in order. That surmise is that perhaps the true impetus behind the 
Moselle, J)aniel, and Wolter decisions is to throw implied consent 
back in the legislative lap. The court did so by rendering a judgment 
so surprising that it must call attention to the situation, and that at 
the same time will curtail litigation by setting forth a definitive solu­
tion. The solution decided upon was to foreclose the taking of blood 
without court order. Several observations support this surmise: 
First, the general overabundance of implied consent litigation as evi­
denced by these three cases coming before the court at the same 
time; second, the sua sponte application by the court of CPL 240.40 
to the problem when none of the briefs of counsel nor the courts 
below perceived any such relevancy; lastly, the incongruity between 
this decision and the one two weeks earlier in Abe A., which also 
dealt with the core issues. 
That the matter is back in the legislative lap has recently be­
come obvious. 161 The problem is that the boondoggle of the past is 
160. E.g., see supra notes 138-46 and accompanying text. 
161. A memorandum in support of proposed amendments was circulated among 
the New York State District Attorneys Association in January 1983. It summarized the 
proposed revisions in the law as follows: 
Amends subdivison [sic]l of section 1194 of the Vehicle and traffic Law to add 
an additional basis for 'the administration of a chemical test of a motorist's 
breath, blood, urine or saliva at the direction of a police officer. If the officer 
has reasonable grounds to believe the motorist to have been operating a motor 
vehicle in violation of section 1192 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law (driving 
while impaired or intoxicated) and as part of the same criminal transaction, to 
have committed a violation of certain sections of the Penal Law dealing with 
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apt to be repeated. The legislature again seeks to amend 162 and fails 
to perceive that the real need is to repeal. Ever since Schmerber, the 
real privilege of implied consent legislation has not been the privi­
lege to drive, but the privilege to refuse what one may be constitu­
tionally compelled to do, to submit to a blood test. When the 
intrusion is slight, and done under medically safe procedures, and 
when the public interest is so substantial, the constitutional standard 
should apply. 
An unperceived danger, however, lurks behind the court's deci­
sion in Daniel and Wolter. It is the danger of extending the histori­
cal snowball of implied consent to yet another statute, section 240.40 
of the Criminal Procedure Law, and setting forth another boondog­
gle in full force. The evidence, however, is that the boondoggle may 
be well on its way. The proposed legislative remedy to the court's 
decision in Daniel and Wolter is to amend CPL 240.40 so that "[i]t 
shall not be construed to limit or otherwise affect the administration 
of chemical tests pursuant to subdivisions one and two of section 
1194."163 The potential for difficulty is that the remedy is limited to 
chemical tests of the blood, urine or saliva under the implied consent 
statute, but the discovery statute is not so limited. It also provides, 
for example, for the taking of hair or other materials from the 
body.l64 The decision in Daniel and Wolter then may be seen as 
authority in other situations. For example, if Daniel Murphy were 
being questioned in New York today for the strangulation death of 
his wife, and the same facts occurred in relation to the police ob­
taining his fingernail scrapings, the decision in Daniel and Wolter 
may be conclusive that the police were foreclosed from obtaining 
those fingernail scrapings without a court order. Daniel Murphy 
may get away with murder in New York, and the law has snowbal­
assault, reckless endangerment and various forms of homicide, a chemical test 
may be administered at the officer's direction in accordance with section 1194 of 
the Vehicle and Traffic Law and, as provided by subdivision 2 of that section, 
without court order and despite a refusal by the motorist to submit to the test. 
The bill further provides that section 240.40 of the Criminal Procedure Law 
shall not be construed to limit or otherwise affect the administration ofchemical 
tests pursuant to subdivisions one and two of section 1194. 
New York State District Attorneys Ass'n, Memorandum in Support of Amending N.Y. 
VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1194(1), (2) (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983) and N.Y. CRIM. PROC. 
LAW § 240.40 (McKinney 1982) (Jan. 1983). 
162. See id. 
163. Id. 
164. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 24O.4O(2)(b), (v) (McKinney 1982). 
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led from excluding evidence of an unintentional vehicular man­
slaughter to excluding evidence of an intentional murder. 
Donna J. Arnold 
